Building worker power for day laborers in South Korea's construction industry by Yi, Sohoon & Chun, Jennifer Jihye
UCLA
UCLA Previously Published Works
Title
Building worker power for day laborers in South Korea's construction industry
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9s7910dz
Authors
Yi, Sohoon
Chun, Jennifer Jihye
Publication Date
2019-12-04
DOI
10.1177/0020715219889383
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Yi, Sohoon and Jennifer Jihye Chun. 2019 (online first). Building worker power for day laborers in South 
Korea’s construction industry. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0020715219889383 
 
1 
DRAFT 
 
Building worker power for day laborers in South Korea’s construction industry 
 
Sohoon Yi 
University of Toronto Mississauga, Canada 
Jennifer Jihye Chun 
University of California Los Angeles 
 
Abstract  
This article examines how unions build worker power for day laborers in South Korea’s 
construction industry to interrogate the relationship between informality, the construction 
industry, and organized labor. Drawing upon in-depth case studies of three regional branches 
of the Korean Construction Workers Union (KCWU), we find that each branch cultivates 
distinct forms of worker power—associational, structural, and symbolic power—to hold 
capital accountable. Construction day laborers organize despite the regulatory challenges that 
informalize their employment conditions in the context of widespread legal and illegal 
outsourcing. We argue that the crux of informality is capital’s ability to bypass existing labor 
laws and regulations through the elaborately multitiered subcontracting structure. Our case 
study shows multiple approaches to addressing capital’s attempt to elude its responsibility 
around and through legal loopholes through union power-building strategies, rather than 
demanding stronger public intervention from the state. Each form of worker power has 
enabled the KCWU to secure and enforce creative collective agreements that establish some 
uniform standards regarding job quality and job security, although their scope of influence 
varies.  
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2 
Introduction 
 
Day labor in the construction industry is one of the oldest and most enduring forms of 
informal work, performed by workers who labor in the shadows of industrial welfare regimes 
without formal employment contracts, the protection of labor laws, or social security 
provisions. Yet, in contrast to the popular image of rootless day laborers who wander 
haphazardly from site to site, many of today’s construction day laborers are integrated into 
complex supply chains that rely on a multitiered network of subcontracted intermediaries to 
supply labor on demand (Pun, 2016; Swider, 2015; Weil, 2005; Yun, 2017). In South Korea’s 
construction industry, the vast majority of workers are employed on a daily or temporary 
basis and work in a spectrum of unregulated activities alongside formally employed workers 
(Yun, 2017).  
The co-presence of formal and informal labor on the same job site calls attention to 
the regulatory challenges characterizing informality in the context of widespread outsourcing, 
privatization, and financialization. Rather than exist as a separate and detached sphere, 
informality operates in tandem with formality, enabling capital to shirk responsibility for 
adhering to labor and welfare regulations, despite the legal obligation to do so. As Portes and 
Haller (2005: 408) emphasize, “By definition, informal economic activities bypass existing 
laws and regulatory agencies of the state.” In South Korea, many day laborers slip through 
the cracks of labor regulations designed for formally employed workers due to the lack of 
written contracts and the high thresholds for unemployment insurance and pensions (Yun, 
2017: 18). In the United States, the growth of the informal worker population since the 1980s 
is linked to the rise of a “gloves off economy” in which employers “either evade or outright 
violate the core laws and standards that govern job quality” (Bernhardt et al., 2008: 2). 
Similarly, in China, despite the presence of socialist laws that guarantee labor rights and 
social protection, informal work has increased drastically in the context of three decades of 
economic liberalization, particularly in the country’s booming construction industry 
(Kuruvilla, Lee, and Gallagher, 2011; Pun 2016; Swider, 2015). 
Given the myriad obstacles to securing basic legal rights and welfare protections, 
scholars and practitioners repeatedly emphasize the need to examine creative and flexible 
approaches to organizing informal workers (Bonner and Spooner, 2011; Chun and Agarwala, 
2016; Eaton, Schurman, and Chen, 2017; Gallin, 2001; Mosoetsa, Stillerman, and Tilly, 
2016; Webster, Britwun, and Bhowmik, 2017). A growing body of literature examines the 
creation of alternative and hybrid organizational forms—such as worker centers (Fine, 
Grabelsky, and Narro, 2008), cooperatives and NGOs (Chun and Kim, 2018; Rosaldo, 2006), 
and community- and place-based associations (Theodore, 2015)—that can overcome the 
barriers of organizing informal workers with limited experience with unions, fragmented 
workplaces, and intersecting oppressions along race, gender, and migration status. Given 
capital’s success in eluding regulatory control, scholars also highlight the importance of 
strategically targeting the state, rather than employers (Agarwala, 2013; Rosaldo, 2016). 
Agarwala (2013) finds that in India construction worker unions have developed an innovative 
model to improve informal workers’ jobs and livelihoods by leveraging their power as 
citizens rather than workers. Interestingly, this model does not challenge flexible production 
structures by making conventional union demands for job security and minimum wages; 
rather, it consists of state-mandated, sector-specific “welfare boards” that provide health care, 
pensions, education scholarships, and marriage and death subsidies to informal workers. 
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Creating novel organizational forms and targeting alternative entities such as the state 
have garnered important victories for informal workers, not only in India but also for 
informal recyclers in Colombia (Rosaldo, 2016), informal transport workers in Tanzania 
(Rizzo, 2013), home-based care workers in the United States (Delp and Quan, 2002), and 
domestic workers around the world (Fish, 2017). Yet, when it comes to employer-directed 
collective action strategies, we still have much to learn about creative practices and 
organizational experiments occurring within unions. This lacuna is not surprising, given the 
resistance of bureaucratic organizations like unions to change. However, scholars 
documenting union innovation, including within the construction industry, point to notable 
shifts, including the extension of membership boundaries to formerly excluded groups of 
immigrants, the channeling of union resources to support training and service provision to 
non-union workers in informal jobs, and the role of social movement leaders in changing 
union cultures and practices (see Fine, Grabelsky and Narro, 2008). Curiously missing, 
however, is attention to what many labor scholars consider the bread-and-butter activities of 
unionism—namely, waging workplace strikes and negotiating collective bargaining 
agreements.  
Not surprisingly, informal workers rarely strike, not only because of the ease in which 
they can be hired and fired but also due to the practical difficulties of identifying an 
appropriate bargaining entity. Construction day laborers work in a variety of jobs that involve 
a wide range of intermediaries, including individual foremen, team leaders, equipment and 
machinery owners, labor-hire companies, specialty contractors, and principal contractors. As 
informal work becomes prevalent in sectors with a history of union representation and 
capacity, forward-thinking unions can adapt creatively to flexible production systems. The 
key to success, it would seem, is to develop the kind of leverage that can raise and enforce 
minimum standards across an entire supply chain. As with workers in the formal sector, this 
means cultivating forms of worker power that can secure concessions and regulate working 
conditions (Lévesque and Murray, 2010; Silver, 2003; Wright, 2000). Yet unions 
representing informal workers face the additional challenge of figuring out how to do so in 
the context of multiple layers of subcontracting designed to confound regulatory control.  
Building on the indispensable conceptual framework of worker power first outlined 
by Erik Olin Wright (2000: 962) and then elaborated by Beverly Silver (2003:13-14), we 
examine how informal workers’ unions cultivate worker power to pressure firms located 
higher up the chain to take responsibility for improving labor conditions. Given the relational 
and conditional nature of worker power, we focus on the importance of organizational 
resources and strategic capacities that enable informal workers’ unions to exercise various 
forms of worker power in the context of regulatory constraints and opportunities, including: 
(1) associational power, which derives from the strength of workers’ collective organizations 
and collective actions; (2) structural power, which derives from workers’ strategic location in 
economic systems, be it industrial assembly lines or construction supply chains; and (3) 
symbolic power, which is a less stable and noninstitutional form of associational power that 
derives from the contested arena of culture and public debates about justice (Chun, 2009: 18). 
Our findings draw upon a case study of the Korean Construction Workers Union 
(KCWU) and its efforts to challenge employment violations and raise standards in the 
residential construction industry. The KCWU is an ideal empirical case, given its founding in 
2007 as a single industrial union that strives to represent all construction site workers outside 
industrial plants, including day laborers. The empirical analysis, which focuses on three 
regional branches of the KCWU’s Site Workers Division, utilizes field research conducted 
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between September and October 2015 and in July 2016 in Seoul, Daegu, Busan, and Ansan, 
including participant observation at KCWU union offices and construction sites as well as ten 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with current and former KCWU officials.1 Our findings 
show that regulatory changes in the nation’s construction industry created an opportunity for 
unions to target specialty contractors located higher up in multitiered contracting chains as 
“real employers.” However, their ability to secure and enforce collective agreements beyond 
the legally stipulated bargaining process differed according to the specific forms of worker 
power that day laborers exert in complex, interdependent fields of action. 
Steel fixers and formwork carpenters utilized strength in numbers, strong internal 
solidarity, and a high degree of militancy against a tightly coordinated network of firms in the 
Daegu-Gyeongbuk region to secure region-wide collective agreements, utilizing the 
associational power of workers organized with an ability to act collectively. Strategically 
positioned casting workers and formwork carpenters engaged in selective work disruptions 
against a more loosely coordinated network of firms in the Busan-Ulsan Gyeongnam region, 
capitalizing on the structural power of workers enmeshed in coordinated production 
processes and tight labor markets. In the Central-Western Gyeonggi region, which consists of 
highly mobile firms and a dispersed workforce in the region’s smaller-scale market, union 
staff members led public shaming campaigns aimed at temporarily shutting down production 
at firms targeted for workplace violations, a form of symbolic power rooted in the moral force 
of public dramas. Each form of worker power enabled unions to create new regulatory 
environments to improve the conditions of informal work—with varying levels of 
effectiveness—in ways that worked around, not through, existing rules and laws. In other 
words, rather than treat legal exclusion as a foregone conclusion, unions used the double-
edged quality of laws and state mechanisms to create a space of political contestation that 
pressured firms dependent on informal labor to address collective demands (Lee, 2007).  
In the sections that follow, we contextualize South Korea’s residential construction 
sector and the use of informal workers in complex, multitiered supply chains. Next, we 
discuss the relationship between informality and unionism, outlining how which day laborers’ 
unions developed essential resources and strategic capabilities to tackle multitiered 
contracting chains. Then, we analyze the power-building strategies of three KCWU regional 
branch unions, paying close attention to how variation across job types, regional labor 
markets, and collective action strategies influenced the specific forms of worker power that 
unions exerted to secure collective agreements with targeted employers. We conclude by 
discussing the importance of theorizing informality as a contested space in which informal 
workers can develop creative and flexible disruption strategies to hold capital responsible for 
improving the conditions of informal work. 
 
Informality and Multitiered Subcontracting in South Korea’s Construction Industry  
 
In contrast to the small-scale nature of the residential construction sector in places like the 
United States (Belman and Smith, 2009), South Korea’s residential construction industry is 
dominated by the construction of high-rise, mega-apartment complexes (ap’at’ŭ tanji) that 
house almost half of the country’s population.2 A multitiered network of firms and 
intermediaries carries out the work of completing large-scale, capital-intensive building 
projects (see Figure 1). At the top of chain are some of the world’s most profitable 
multinational firms, such as Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. and Samsung 
C&T Corporation, that secure lucrative building projects. As “general contractors,” these 
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firms operate more as managers than actual builders, since they contract out virtually every 
stage of the building process to “specialty contractors” (Weil, 2005). Under the Framework 
Act on the Construction Industry (revised in 2008), specialty contractors must be formally 
registered and are legally required to hire workers in direct employment contracts. Fiscally, 
registered specialty contractors must also demonstrate possession of adequate funds to 
complete the terms of contracts before the start of the building process, including labor costs.3 
The bidding process to secure specialty trade contracts, as with all other construction 
contracts, is highly competitive and often contingent on delivering the most cost-effective 
services in the most time-effective manner. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Despite clearly outlined procedures that prohibit outsourcing beyond specialty 
contractors in specific building trades, specialty contractors rely on a vast network of 
unauthorized intermediaries to supply cheap and skilled labor for tightly organized 
production schedules. Intermediaries range from small teams led by a single individual (e.g., 
team leader) to predatory labor brokers known by industry insiders as oyaji and sidaukke 
oyaji, terms rooted in the exploitative and discriminatory Japanese colonial labor system (see 
Kawashima, 2009: 50).4 Until 2009, labor brokers operated legally under the “execution 
participant system,” which allowed unlicensed individuals to function as labor supply 
subcontractors and hire informal day laborers.5 Despite legal prohibitions, labor contracting 
beyond the third tier of subcontracting continues to thrive due to the ongoing use of labor 
brokers. In building structure work, oyaji and sidaukke oyaji are commonly paid by the 
volume or the amount of work completed by the subcontractor and operate at the fourth and 
fifth tiers of outsourcing, although they often hold honorary titles in specialty contractor firms 
to give the appearance of legality. The majority of informal day laborers depend on 
individual foremen or team leaders who are well connected to labor brokers like an oyaji or 
sidaukke oyaji to secure gainful employment, even if it is on a day-to-day or finite basis. 
Pervasive subcontracting and outsourcing in the construction industry has resulted in 
a climate of rampant employment violations and hazardous occupational health and safety 
conditions (see BWI and KFCITU, 2018). Construction workers’ average wages are already 
disproportionately low in relation to the overall workforce, and workers experience additional 
financial hardship due to chronic wage delays and unpaid wages (Yun, 2017: 16). Excessive 
working hours and high rates of industrial accidents are also an industry norm. Average daily 
work hours well exceeding the legal standard of eight hours per day, particularly during 
periods of work intensification associated with production schedules and deadlines.  
These poor and dangerous working conditions correspond with a workforce that is 
highly age- and gender-segregated and increasingly reliant on vulnerable groups of migrant 
labor. Native-born South Korean men in their forties, fifties, and sixties represent the 
majority of the workforce in regional construction labor markets around the country. Korean 
Chinese (coethnic) workers, known as Joseonjok, represent the largest segment of migrant 
construction workers. They are able to enter the country more freely in comparison to non-
ethnic Korean workers through visas they acquire as temporary migrant workers and as 
skilled overseas Korean migrants which allow them to work in the construction industry (see 
Lee and Chien, 2017). Yet the numbers of non-ethnic Korean workers from China, Vietnam, 
and other parts of Southeast Asia are also growing, as prime and specialty contractors 
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continue to rely on labor brokers, both domestically and transnationally, to supply cheap and 
skilled labor. 
 
Informality, Power Resources, and Construction Day Laborers’ Unions in South Korea 
 
The relationship between unions and informality is complicated. The prevalence of 
informality in labor markets around the world reveals dilemmas about the future of labor 
unions and their ability to establish and enforce industry-wide employment standards. 
Breman and Van der Linden (2014: 932) argue that, in the current regime of informality 
under financialized global capitalism, many industrial unions are confused and debilitated by 
capital’s “refusal to adhere to decent labour standards and social security arrangements.” 
Unions in the construction sector have also been complicit in the flourishing of informal work 
(Erlich and Grabelsky, 2005; Rabourn, 2008; Weil, 2005). For example, building and 
construction trades unions in the United States did little to prevent “unscrupulous contractors 
from routinely violating wage and hour laws, worker compensation agreements, and safety 
and health regulations” as the predominantly non-union and immigrant workforce 
skyrocketed in thriving residential construction markets in the 1980s and 1990s (Fine, 
Grabelsky and Narrow, 2008: 38).  
We still have much to learn about cases in rapidly industrializing nations in which the 
growth of construction unions has occurred in the context of widespread informality. In South 
Korea, organized labor’s history is more recent and compressed, as unions face the 
challenges of dismantling the nearly centurylong legacy of colonial and authoritarian labor 
repression while simultaneously building strong collective labor organizations in today’s era 
of global neoliberalism and financialized capitalism (Shin, 2013). Day laborers in South 
Korea’s construction industry began unionizing en masse in the late 1980s, in conjunction 
with the explosion of democratic unionism around the country (Yun, 2017: 19). Democratic 
unions rapidly expanded just before the liberalization of the national economy in the 1990s, 
when the state and capital mounted new offensives (Koo, 2002) and construction unions grew 
despite the Asian financial crisis in 1997 in the absence of an established social security 
regime. 
Democratic unions’ efforts to build associational power mainly took the form of 
strengthening what Lévesque and Murray (2010: 338) call “network embeddedness,” strong 
linkages among unions and other organizations, including other unions, community groups, 
and social movement organizations. In South Korea, day laborers, like formal sector workers, 
focused on forging strong horizontal and vertical linkages between and across construction 
sector unions. This process began in 1998 with the establishment of the first day laborers 
union, the Seoul Day Laborers Union, and culminated in 2007 with the formation of the 
KCWU, which is affiliated with the premier industry organization, the Korean Federation of 
Construction Industry Unions (KFCITU).6 The KFCITU, in turn, is affiliated with the Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and the Global Union Federation, the Building and 
Wood Workers International (BWI). By linking individual unionized day laborers on local 
construction sites to national and international organizations, the KCWU gained the kind of 
material, human, and programmatic resources that strengthened their organizational 
infrastructure as well as enhanced their sense of collective identity, shared history, and 
solidarity with the broader labor movement (Lévesque and Murray, 2010: 336–340). 
While day laborers’ unions in South Korea developed strong and well-connected 
organizations, they still faced the challenge of representing the needs of informal workers 
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employed in highly transient jobs by exploitative intermediaries. During the 1990s, 
membership in the National Association of Construction Day Laborers Unions peaked at 
30,000 workers, but membership levels were difficult to sustain as unions became consumed 
with the day-to-day problems that day laborers faced around chronic unpaid wages and 
workplace accidents. Union leaders, many of whom had close ties to the nation’s militant 
democratic labor movement, also become concerned that they were devolving into a service 
model of unionism (Yun, 2017: 27). To overcome these challenges, day laborers’ unions 
needed to figure out another way to deal with widespread violations plaguing informal 
construction work.  
 
Building Strategic Capacity and Leveraging the Law 
 
Construction unions in South Korea began fine-tuning their capacity to identify strategic 
targets and secure precedent-setting collective agreements in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis and in response to the industry’s turn toward informalization, particularly in 
the equipment and machinery subsector. Lévesque and Murray (2010: 341) describe 
“strategic capabilities” as the “aptitudes, competencies, abilities, social skills and know-how” 
that enable unions to convert organizational resources into effective worker power. With key 
support from the Swedish Trade Union Confederation and the Swedish Confederation of 
Professional Employees (LO-TCO) and the International Federation of Building and Wood 
Workers,7 construction unions regrouped as the newly formed KFCITU in 2000 and began a 
concerted effort to tackle widespread violations in multitiered construction supply chains. 
According to Jin Sook Lee, who served as the international director of KFCITU at the time, 
“the main focus of the trade union project was to support the local union’s efforts to train 
organizers, site delegates, and key leaders on issues of organizing, trade union representation, 
and trade union education” (email communication, 17 April 2017). Training and education 
also focused on the industry’s complex subcontracting and outsourcing practices and figuring 
out how construction workers in different jobs were similarly but differentially affected 
across exploitative, multitiered supply chains.   
During the early 2000s, the KFCITU experienced early and decisive successes 
unionizing formally employed construction workers, namely, tower crane operators, as well 
as concrete mixing truck drivers, dump truck drivers, and excavator truck drivers who lost 
direct employment due to their conversion to “independent contractors.” Yun (2017: 14) 
describes a “massive shedding of labor, particularly among construction equipment 
operators,” since the 1990s by firms seeking to cut costs and avoid unions in the context of 
neoliberal restructuring and financial crises. Formally employed workers also experienced 
deteriorating wages and working conditions, sparking a new wave of union organizing that 
exposed the vulnerabilities of construction supply chains to well-coordinated workplace 
strikes. For example, the first nationwide general strike by unionized tower crane operators in 
2001 lasted twenty-eight days and “paralyzed entire construction sites” (Yun, 2017: 22). 
Tower crane operators can be found on every residential construction site and are directly 
employed by construction equipment rental companies, but, much like day laborers, they 
experience chronic delayed and unpaid wages and high accident rates. Tower crane workers 
used their structural power to negotiate directly with the Korean Tower Crane Cooperative, 
which consisted of 140 member companies. Unionized tower crane operators waged strikes 
in 2003 and 2007 that won Sundays off, eight-hour workdays, and forty-hour workweeks for 
the first time for construction workers. 
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Another crucial victory occurred in 2007, this time in the legal arena. Article 29 in the 
Framework Act on the Construction Industry (FACI) permitted the legal use of labor 
subcontractors by specialty contractors under certain conditions. Well aware that this legal 
loophole legitimized the widespread practice of unauthorized layers of subcontracting, the 
KFCITU fought vigorously for its removal. That same year the KFCITU secured additional 
revisions to the Labor Standards Act (LSA) that outlined a financial mechanism for firms 
higher up in construction supply chains to take responsibility for unpaid and delayed wages. 
Yun (2017: 29) explains: 
if a subcontractor other than a contractor prescribed in the FACI fails to pay 
wages to a worker he/she has used, the direct upper-tier contractor shall take 
responsibility for paying the wages of the worker of the subcontractor, jointly 
with the subcontractor (newly inserted Article 44-2). Also, according to the 
revised LSA, if a main contractor subcontracts the construction work, resulting 
in two or more tiers of contractors, the worker may demand the main 
contractor to directly pay an amount equivalent to the wages the subcontractor 
should have paid to him or her (newly inserted Article 44-3 paragraph 2). 
While legal exclusions and loopholes still remain, revised industry regulations created a new 
regulatory framework that unequivocally identified specialty contractors as the legal 
employers, whether or not they operated as actual employers in practice. For unions, this 
regulatory change created new opportunities. On the one hand, unions could follow the fiscal 
paper trail and identify registered specialty contractors as legal employers, explains Pak 
Inch’ŏl, a union executive at the KCWU headquarters (interview, 8 September 2015, Seoul). 
On the other hand, the revised law allowed unions to rebuke specialty contractors that rely 
extensively on intermediaries to complete construction projects as mere “paper companies” 
that engage in “illegal” subcontracting (interview, 8 September 2015, Seoul).  
With critical regulatory changes in place, the newly established KCWU was poised to 
face the strategic challenges of organizing day laborers directly by creating a single union 
comprised of both formal and informal construction workers. The KCWU currently operates 
four divisions: the Tower Crane Division, which has extremely high levels of union density; 
the Construction Machinery Division, which organizes machinery operators such as dump 
truck drivers and ready-mix concrete truck operators; the Electricians’ Division, which 
organizes outside-line electricians; and the Site Workers Division, which is the subject of our 
study and consists almost entirely of day laborers such as formwork carpenters, steel fixers, 
casting workers, demolition workers, scaffold builders, welders, plumbers, and bricklayers, 
among others.   
Building on its knowledge and experience of using targeted workplace disruptions to 
win new types of collective agreements for tower crane operators, the KCWU Site Workers’ 
Division launched a national strategy to target specialty contracting firms located higher up 
the supply chain to raise standards for day laborers. The national strategy, to be implemented 
by each regional branch, entailed the negotiation of “creative” collective bargaining 
agreements with regional representatives of the Korea Specialty Contractors Association, 
which is a statutory employer body according to FACI. The collective bargaining process was 
creative in the sense that unions sought regional employer representatives with whom they 
could collectively bargain beyond the short duration of the individual firm’s construction 
project and beyond the legally stipulated bargaining process outlined in the Trade Union and 
Labor Relations Adjustment Act (TULRAA), which requires collective agreements to be 
negotiated between two clearly defined parties, one representing the employer and one 
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representing employees. It also required branch unions to figure out how to implement a 
national strategy in specific geographic labor markets and with different groups of day 
laborers. 
 
Comparing Union Power-Building Strategies in Three Regions 
 
We turn our attention to the power-building strategies of three regional branch unions in the 
KCWU’s Site Workers Division: the Daegu-Gyeongbuk region (hereafter Daegu), the Busan-
Ulsan Gyeongnam region (hereafter Busan), and the Central-Western Gyeonggi region 
(hereafter CW-Gyeonggi). We focus on the process of building distinct forms of worker 
power for informal workers to highlight the critical importance of turning power resources 
into strategic capabilities (Lévesque and Murray, 2010: 336–340).  
Silver (2003: 13–15) highlights this critical distinction when she emphasizes the 
difference between the forms of power that workers theoretically have and the “actual use of 
that power to struggle for better working conditions.” Building on Wright’s lucid formulation 
of worker power (Wright, 2000: 962), Silver found that workers’ capacity to exercise 
different forms of power depended on world-historical shifts in the economic and political 
structures of capitalism. Yet her emphasis on macro-level conditions rarely acknowledged the 
significance of meso-level organizational practices and specific legal environments for 
exerting worker power. Few studies have also examined how informal workers cultivate 
structural power by innovating strike and collective bargaining practices, focusing more on 
the importance of developing symbolic power to compensate for their lack of leverage and 
lack of collective labor rights (Chun, 2009).  
In each regional case, we find that branch unions possessed varying forms of worker 
power, shaped by differences in the types of job and firms in a particular geographic labor 
market. Varying levels of employer organization at the regional level also influenced branch 
unions’ capacity to negotiate regional collective agreements by shaping the kinds of power-
building strategies unions cultivate to force concessions from key employers. Table 1 
summarizes the power-building strategies of each regional union, which is discussed in 
further detail in the following sections. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
KCWU’s Daegu Branch and Associational Power  
All interview participants in and outside the KCWU identified the Daegu branch as the 
strongest in the Builders Division. According to one union leader, the Daegu branch has a 
strong “grip” on work sites (hyŏnchang changaknyŏk) through its highly mobilized grassroots 
membership (interview, 8 September 2015, Seoul). Union teams are routinely dispatched to 
“stop” work at large-scale apartment complexes, where the majority of construction in the 
region takes place, when firms do not abide by wage standards and working conditions set by 
regional agreements. The Daegu branch was also the first to successfully negotiate a 
collective agreement with a regional employer body, which it has renewed every year since 
2008, due in large part to the tightly coordinated Daegu Steel and Concrete Council 
(ch’ŏlk’on hyŏphoe). This employers’ body exerts pressure on firms across the regional 
supply chain to abide by the terms of informal regional agreements.   
The Daegu branch’s strong associational power can be traced to a militant strike 
waged by approximately 800 steel fixers in 2004, who at the time were organized under the 
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umbrella of the Korean Federation of Construction Industry Trade Unions (KFCITU), since it 
predated the formation of KCWU as a single industrial union. Steel fixers had experienced 
widespread wage arrears and the continuous reduction of their wages since the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. An experienced union organizer helped organize steel fixers to engage in 
militant collective action, which laid the foundation for a much larger strike, launched two 
years later, of 2,500 steel fixers and formwork carpenters. Nam P’il-gyu, a former union 
official in Daegu who organized both strikes, vividly described the scale of union disruption 
during the 2006 strike, which not only halted construction on small- and large-scale sites for 
thirty-two consecutive days but disrupted everyday life in the city: 
It was like a liberation army independence situation. I think about 88 troops of 
riot police were dispatched in Daegu. There were two subway struggles, we 
called the “Whac-a-Mole” struggle, in which more than 1,000 people went 
down into a subway station and came up another exit. The police could not 
follow us because they would block the traffic. By the time the police got their 
lines together and traffic organized, we came up from another subway station. 
We paralyzed the entire city (interview, 15 September 2015, Daegu). 
Rank-and-file union members sustained the strike in the face of tremendous police 
counteraction, generating enough pressure to help the union secure its first region-wide 
collective bargaining agreement with an employer body representing specialty contractors in 
2006. However, the agreement was later invalidated because the execution participant 
system, which was still in effect under the Framework Act, did not hold specialty contractors 
solely responsible as legal employers. By the same logic, the union leaders who led the strike 
could not benefit from legal protections for union activities that took place outside TULRAA, 
leading to the arrest of thirty-three union officials and members.  
Changes to the Framework Act in 2008 gave the union legal footing to target specialty 
contractors and pressure them to engage in annual collective bargaining negotiations. The 
union’s reorganization as part of a single industrial union in 2007, driven in large part by the 
successes in Daegu, also provided a more effective structure to take on employers at the 
regional level. However, TULRAA only recognizes an agreement between the union and 
individual companies, not the regional council that represent employers on de facto grounds. 
Therefore, the regional union branch engages in a two-pronged strategy: an actual power-
building strategy that targets regional employers through an informal regional bargaining 
process and an official process in which the KCWU signs identical agreements with 
individual employers, the majority of whom bargain with the union indirectly through the 
Daegu Steel and Concrete Council. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
This informal bargaining process commences each year when the branch union 
notifies the Daegu Steel and Concrete Council of its intent to bargain. The council is a 
subsidiary of the Korean Specialty Contractors Association (the statutory employer’s body 
under the FACI), but it technically acts as an advisory council rather than an official 
representative body for employers (Sim, 2008). Nevertheless, the council, which consists of 
four to five representatives, negotiates with the union to establish a template agreement that 
sets de facto regional standards, including higher daily wage rates, better working conditions, 
recognition for on-site union activities, priority union hiring, and mandatory consultation 
with unions before laying off union members.8 The council, which is tightly coordinated 
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across the regional supply chain, then pressures individual contractors to increase their 
subcontracting prices and sign official individual collective agreements with the union. Given 
the discrepancy between the actual and paper bargaining procedures, the union ensures the 
enforcement of the agreements as well as expands its geographic reach through its industrial 
union structure, which mobilizes workers across employers and work sites in the region, by 
disciplining firms that do not abide by the terms of union agreements. 
From the union’s point of view, bargaining and enforcement power comes from its 
strong associational power. Nam P’il-gyu, a former Daegu union branch leader, used the term 
“iron formation” to describe the strength of the union’s early workplace disruptions, stating, 
“No matter what the company did to try and break their agreements, we could always count 
on 300 to 400 people … to go directly to the problem sites and re-establish order” (interview, 
15 September 2015, Daegu). Council members have an incentive to collectively bargain with 
the union rather than respond separately to each case of union militancy since the union has 
the power to cause significant and costly delays to construction. The union’s capacity to 
organize region-wide strikes, such as in 2012 and 2013, further invigorates their militant 
base, especially in a context when individual union leaders are willing to take risks and make 
personal sacrifices, including incurring onerous fines and facing imprisonment, for engaging 
in unauthorized strike actions at the regional level.  
The union’s associational power, however, is not effective unless it can be directed 
against a tightly organized council that not only comes to the bargaining table to negotiate 
with the union every year but also encourages member and nonmember specialty contractors 
to adhere to the agreements. The council also enforces “regional rules” on nonmember 
construction companies who come to the Daegu/Gyeongbuk region to build, a practice that 
inevitably benefits local employers by creating a level playing field (interview, 15 September 
2015, Daegu). Thus, by deploying the age-old strategy of disruptive militant unionism 
wielded by a strong union membership base against a tightly coordinated employer body, the 
Daegu branch union established, enforced, and renewed innovative collective bargaining 
protocols negotiated outside existing regulatory frameworks, which serve as model for other 
regions to replicate. 
 
KCWU’s Busan Branch and Structural Power  
 
KCWU’s Busan branch has experienced remarkable growth since 2014. Within a single year, 
branch membership grew from 300 to 1,900. The union’s growth strategy owes much to its 
capacity to organize a relatively small number of strategically located concrete casting 
workers who were instrumental in later negotiating region-wide collective agreements for the 
much large numbers of formwork carpenters employed on construction sites. 
The union recognized early on that organizing smaller groups of concrete casting 
workers is both easier and has more relative impact, given the capacity of certain trades to 
decisively halt the production process. The union estimated that as of 2015 they had 
successfully recruited 500 out of the 600 total casting workers into the union (interview, 24 
September 2015, Busan).9 Casting workers are a small, tightly knit social group, and branch 
union organizers benefited from the extensive personal and social networks they had 
cultivated within the group, especially with team leaders, who, in turn, organized members of 
their personal work teams to join the union.  
The first issues the union took on in response to team leaders’ complaints were 
declining wages and the “unreasonable” pricing practices of subcontracting intermediaries 
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(tokĕp oyaji or sidaukke oyaji), who are typically owners of mounted concrete pump vehicles, 
costly equipment that is essential to casting work (interview, 24 September 2015, Busan). 
The union organized selective work refusals at targeted sites to pressure companies to 
negotiate enterprise-level site agreements (hyŏnjang hapĕisŏ). Work boycotts, which the 
branch leader Chi Hyŏn-sŏk called “[labor] supply stoppage” (t’uip chungchi), functioned as 
de facto strikes. Casting work, which was performed by teams who work intermittently on 
multiple sites, was essential before the work of formwork carpenters, who work for a longer 
period at each site in large numbers to complete the frames of high-rise buildings (see Figure 
3). According to Chi (interview, 24 September 2015, Busan), given casting workers’ relative 
autonomy, once the union made the right contacts and grasped the internal work rules within 
casting work teams, a small group of casting workers could essentially halt production by 
simply not showing up to the job. Figure 3 highlights concrete casting workers’ strategic 
location in the construction process, which enabled them to convert workplace bargaining 
power into key concessions from firms. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
These strategic actions resulted in immediate improvements, including higher 
overtime pay rates, which were particularly advantageous to concrete casting workers, who 
routinely had to wait in standby mode for prolonged periods, since their work was completed 
in the final stage of the building process. The union then negotiated additional gains, 
including the allocation of half-day wages for every two nights of overtime, an earlier starting 
time for night pay rates, Sunday pay rates, and restrictions on labor intensity and the 
minimum number of workers in casting work teams. Specialty contractors resisted 
implementing such changes for five years throughout the campaign; however, Chi explains, 
the union eventually convinced specialty contractors that it was cheaper to pay a smaller 
number of workers overtime wages than to face disruptions to highly time-sensitive 
production schedules. This worked, according to Chi, since the cost of casting work accounts 
for a small proportion of a specialty contractor’s total construction cost, and half of such costs 
are spent on equipment.  
Improving the wages and working conditions of unionized casting workers greatly 
facilitated the union’s later efforts to organize the much larger group of formwork carpenters. 
Branch union organizers used their personal networks with unionized casting workers to meet 
formwork carpentry team leaders. In addition, the union had already established relationships 
with management at multiple construction sites. Many formwork carpenters were also aware 
of the union’s capacity to disrupt production through coordinated work stoppages by 
unionized concrete casting workers, revealing a high degree of the union’s network 
embeddedness. 
The union took advantage of structural marketplace bargaining power to recruit 
formwork carpenters. According to Chi (interview, 24 September 2015, Busan), the union 
was “lucky” with the market, because the regional economic boom happened in a way that 
supported the union’s plans and strategies. Chi explained that when the union started 
organizing formwork carpenters, jobs were plentiful and demand exceeded supply, so much 
so that employers gave them the nickname “golden carpenters” (kĕmmoksu). The workers 
wielded marketplace bargaining power to secure eight-hour workdays and significant wage 
increases.10 However, Chi explained that when jobs began waning in 2013, formwork 
carpenters actively sought out the union for job placements. When rumors circulated that the 
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union could secure high-paying jobs, more and more workers joined the union. 
The union compensated for its declining marketplace bargaining power by engaging 
in a strategic campaign against a particular specialty contracting firm. Chi explained: 
In October last year, there was a site run by SK Construction which is 
notorious for their opposition to the union. The specialty contractor that SK 
subcontracted work to was the largest subcontractor in Busan, and also the 
president of the Busan Steel and Concrete Council. We picked that site. If we 
could win there, we knew we would win the fight. So, we gave it our best. Our 
struggle went on for twenty days. We set up the union tent to hold rallies for 
ten plus consecutive days. After drawing up a collective agreement, no 
specialty contractor gave us a problem. 
By strategically targeting the largest and most powerful specialty contractor, the 
branch union successfully pressured the Busan Steel and Concrete Council to negotiate a 
regional collective agreement, even though the council was relatively loosely organized. 
Consequently, the Busan branch’s union membership rapidly expanded within just one year, 
growing from zero to 1,400 formwork carpenters by 2015. However, the union’s success at 
negotiating its first regional agreement may not translate into continued success, given its 
vulnerability to changes in the composition of the council, which is outside union control. Chi 
expressed such concern in a follow-up interview in 2016, when he pointed out that the new 
council president was from a different firm that was primarily involved in infrastructure 
projects, rather than apartment construction, a subsector with low union membership and 
capacity. 
 
KCWU’s CW-Gyeonggi Branch and Symbolic Power  
 
The CW-Gyeonggi branch differs from the Busan and Daegu branches in a number of 
respects. First, it does not have a regional agreement but instead relies on site-specific 
enterprise agreements for the hiring of union teams and to raise standards for both union and 
non-union workers. Second, in addition to the usual large-scale residential sites, it also 
organizes workers who are employed at small-scale commercial and residential sites. Third, 
its membership includes a large proportion of migrant workers. The branch has 600 dues-
paying members, 180 of whom are Korean Chinese migrants. Although regional collective 
agreements represent more effective and efficient means of collective bargaining, the union’s 
capacity to negotiate them depends on the strength of their associational power and their 
capacity to influence key industry actors. The CW-Gyeonggi branch, which is in the Seoul 
greater metropolitan area, has difficulty recruiting members and cultivating a strong rank-
and-file base. The fluidity of the labor force impedes union organizing, which is exacerbated 
by the high percentage of migrant workers with interregional and international mobility in the 
regional day laborer workforce. Furthermore, capital is also disorganized in the Gyeonggi 
region, where specialty contractors are numerous, competitive, and mobile. According to 
Statistics Korea (2016), in 2015 42% of the total domestic construction project budget was 
spent in the Seoul greater metropolitan area, and the Gyeonggi region had the highest 
expenditure (25%) in the country.11 Chŏng Bŏmsu, an executive at the CW-Gyeonggi branch, 
explains, “The reason why we cannot do regional collective agreement is there is no company 
that works twice in the Ansan region [where the branch office is located]. We have to fight 
new guys every year” (interview, 30 September 2015, Ansan). 
Given its low unionization rate, the fluidity of the workforce, and its lack of working 
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relationships with employers and employer groups, the CW-Gyeonggi branch instead tried to 
cultivate symbolic power to shame small-scale construction projects to hire union teams at 
union rates. In essence, this power-building strategy involves intensifying public dramas 
against firms lower down the construction supply chain that violate labor laws, a fail-safe 
strategy since, according to Chŏng, “everything you see is illegal” on small-scale sites. In 
some cases, the union’s “name and shame” approach involves going directly to sites and 
reporting violations to the Ministry of Labor in front of site managers or announcing their 
intention to do so, which elicits a quick response from building owners, who then call the 
union and ask “what they want.”12 When contractors refuse to negotiate, the union escalates 
the legal dispute into a cantankerous drama by creating what Chŏng calls a “ruckus” 
(kkaengpan). Union organizers set up loudspeakers in front of the targeted site, stage rallies 
every morning, and often hold long-term tent occupations—some lasting for several weeks 
(interview, 30 September 2015, Ansan). Organizers also drive to targeted sites in the union 
van with speakers affixed to the roof, repeatedly voicing condemnation of the firms for their 
legal violations. That many small-scale construction sites are located in residential zones adds 
to the union’s “publicity reach” when they “make a scene” (interview, 30 September 2015, 
Ansan). 
By sustaining its ability to create a ruckus at different sites since launching its April 
2012 campaign, the union has pressured employers at many small construction sites in the 
Ansan region to hire at least one or two union members “just to keep the union quiet.” The 
union is aware that such strategies, which rely on a high level of persuasion, are both labor-
intensive and extremely ephemeral, since they do not result in binding agreements. But in the 
absence of other sources of associational and structural power, union leaders rely on the 
willingness of a few people to go site to site and force employers to create union jobs.  
The union’s success in securing higher-paid union jobs has caught the attention of an 
increasing number of migrant workers, who have since joined the CW-Gyeonggi branch—a 
distinct difference from the Daegu and Busan branches, which have only a few, if any, 
migrant worker members. Most small-scale construction sites have shorter production 
spans—from several weeks to a few months at the most—so workers are constantly in search 
of work. Migrant workers make up a large percentage of the region’s day laborer workforce, 
so as the union’s small-site campaigns gained traction, more of them sought out the union in 
hopes of finding jobs. This phenomenon is visible in the union’s parking lot, which 
essentially functions as a hiring hall, as approximately seventy to eighty union members 
gather early each morning to be assigned jobs and sent to different sites for the day. 
CW-Gyeonggi branch’s small-site construction campaign is a clear departure from the 
national strategy, which targets large-scale capital with the express purpose of securing 
region-wide collective agreements. By deploying loudspeakers, waging prolonged rallies, and 
threatening law enforcement in their public dramas, the branch union cultivated a sustained, 
highly labor-intensive, and insecure form of symbolic power. A KCWU executive at the 
national headquarters commented during an interview that the CW-Gyeonggi branch 
campaigns are “not meaningful” because “meaningful” campaigns are those that make 
change through regional collective agreements (interview, 8 September 2015, Seoul). This 
executive asserted that the Gyeonggi region will have to wait until the KCWU has the 
strength to negotiate a collective agreement at a national level. The KCWU leadership plans 
to cultivate structural power by organizing workers in regional areas and securing multiple 
regional agreements, through which the union can bargain centrally with the national 
employers unit.13   
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However, to call the branch union’s campaign “not meaningful” ignores the 
significant contributions that the union has made in improving wages and working conditions 
in smaller construction sites. Given the extensive barriers to building more institutionalized 
forms of worker power and the fact that working conditions for informal day laborers are 
extremely poor and routinely ignored by the union, the CW-Gyeonggi branch’s work is worth 
acknowledging, especially for migrant workers who remain unorganized and consistently 
neglected by unions across the country. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
 
This paper has examined the power-building strategies of three regional branches in the 
KCWU’s Site Workers Division: Daegu, Busan and CW-Gyeonggi. Although each branch 
union sought to implement a national strategy that targeted specialty contracting firms higher 
up the chain to negotiate region-wide collective agreements, its ability to do so was shaped by 
its power resources as well as the composition of employer bodies in each regional market. 
Branch unions possessed varying levels of associational power to force employers to make 
concessions to the union. The Daegu branch possessed the most potent form of associational 
power, with a tightly organized and highly militant grassroots membership that could wage 
disruptive strikes and workplace actions against targeted firms. The Busan branch had weaker 
associational power, but union leaders took advantage of the structural power of both 
strategically located concrete casting workers and tight labor markets for formwork 
carpenters during an early stage of organizing. In CW-Gyeonggi, the branch union had weak 
associational and structural power, due to the high mobility of both workers and employers in 
regional construction supply chains; however, organizers successfully waged site-specific 
public dramas that targeted individual firms engaged in workplace violations, particularly 
around health and safety standards, to cultivate symbolic power, resulting in an array of 
individual-level union agreements on small-scale construction sites. 
The composition of employer organizations at the regional level influenced the branch 
unions’ capacity to negotiate agreements outside existing industrial relations frameworks. 
The Daegu branch benefited from a tightly organized regional council of specialty contractors 
under the auspices of the Daegu Steel and Concrete Council. In Busan, the Busan Steel and 
Concrete Council was less centralized, but the union took advantage of its knowledge of the 
council’s leadership to disrupt production at a key firm, resulting in the successful negotiation 
of region-wide agreements. In CW-Gyeonggi, employer organization was the most dispersed, 
creating little opportunity for the union to target specific firms. The branch union’s embrace 
of symbolic struggles as a form of associational power, which is highly unstable and 
resource-intensive, can be understood as a symptom of extensive external constraints, but it 
also yielded unexpected membership gains by recruiting more Korean Chinese migrant 
workers, who work in smaller firms.  
Close empirical analysis of how informal workers cultivate bargaining power despite 
regulatory challenges and unequal power relations reveals the limits of theorizing informal 
work simply in terms of legal exclusion. The cultivation of highly nuanced and place-specific 
power-building strategies against specific configurations of capital reveals that informality is 
better understood as a complex and contested political space between workers, capital, and 
the state. Construction firms across the supply chain consistently try to elude responsibility 
for the conditions of informal work by simply ignoring or escaping direct accountability, 
regardless of industry regulations. However, rather than appealing to the state for better and 
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stronger public intervention, unions work around and through legal constraints and loopholes 
to craft regulatory environments that rely on their own enforcement power. In Daegu, the 
union forced employers to sign collective agreements before the Framework Act recognized 
them as “legal employers.” In Busan, the union took advantage of day laborers’ job flexibility 
to stage a de facto strike. In CW-Gyeonggi, the union used employers’ violation of the law as 
an instrument to demand union rates and improve working conditions. Enforcing union 
agreements can be high-risk endeavors, particularly for individual union members involved in 
militant collective action. Such actions can be deemed unlawful because they encroach on 
“the right of management” (kyŏng’yŏnggwŏn ch’imhae) to conduct business and earn profits, 
but for now they enable the KCWU to improve conditions for informal workers when capital 
and the state are unwilling to do so of their own accord.14 
Informal workers’ ability to cultivate effective forms of power also highlights the 
importance of developing strategic capabilities that take advantage of the organizational 
resources that local unions cultivate. Ananya Roy (2005) reminds us that informality should 
not be understood in dichotomous terms as either a crisis of formality or a heroic form of 
resilience by the poor and disenfranchised. “Informality is not a separate sector but rather a 
series of transactions that connect different economies and spaces to one another,” she 
explains (Roy, 2005: 148). Day laborers in South Korea are inextricably linked to formal 
production processes and capital accumulation processes. Their unions learned to identify the 
vulnerabilities in construction supply chains from the success of unions representing formally 
employed workers such as tower crane operators in cultivating disruptive forms of 
associational and structural power. They also learned how to negotiate creative bargaining 
agreements that regulated wages and working conditions by pressuring firms higher up in 
contracting chains to form representational bargaining entities (Yun, 2017: 27–28). Thus, 
informal workers not only can learn directly from the experiences of formal workers but also 
can adapt and innovate on their collective actions in ways that build the strategic capabilities 
of all workers across highly differentiated yet tightly coordinated supply chains.  
The successes of union power-building strategies for informal workers in South 
Korea’s construction industry may seem exceptional, given its relatively high level of 
organizational capacity and mass mobilization. However, the South Korean union movement, 
like many other labor movements around the world, encountered significant rollbacks in the 
context of neoliberal restructuring and financialized global capitalism. Rather than 
responding with the “confusion and bewilderment” for which Breman and Van der Linden 
(2014) criticize European industrial unions, South Korean unions demonstrated a striking 
capacity to redirect their strategic priorities toward power-building capabilities to support the 
interests of the rapidly growing informal and precarious workforce, despite ongoing 
challenges and conflicts with formal unionized workers (Lee, 2011; Yun, 2011; Shin, 2013). 
Given the prevalence of informality across the Global North and South and its centrality to 
global capital accumulation structures, it is this organizational capacity to adapt and take 
advantage of constantly shifting power dynamics among labor, capital, and the state that can 
make all the difference. 
 	
1 The fieldwork was supported by a Ford Foundation grant (2015–2018) on “Informal 
Construction and Domestic Work: Collaborative Research on Institutional Influences on Job 
Quality” (Chris Tilly, principal investigator; Jennifer Jihye Chun, South Korea coordinator). 
All interviews and participant observation were conducted by Sohoon Yi. 
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2 According to the 2014 Korea Housing Survey (KRIHS, 2014), 49.6% of South Koreans live 
in apartment buildings, whereas only 37.5% live in independent housing units. 
3 For example, in the engineering and building sector, firms are required to hold between 5 
and 24 billion KRW (approximately $5–24 million USD) in financial assets and employ a 
minimum number of staff members (ranging from 5 to 11 depending on the type of registered 
category) with required qualifications. 
4 Oyaji, a colloquial term for “boss” in Japanese, have connections to various team leaders, 
often in a single trade, and usually supply some construction material to site, whereas 
sidaukke oyaji (“subcontractor” or “big oyaji”) typically have connections to multiple oyaji 
across different trades. 
5 Under the execution participant system, it was also illegal to engage in double 
subcontracting—to use two different intermediaries for the same type of work. According to 
the union, it was, however, common for workers to have more than one intermediary in place. 
6 The Seoul Regional Construction Day Laborers Union (Seoul Day Laborers Union) joined 
eight other regional unions to form the National Association of Construction Day Laborers 
Unions (NACDLU) in 1992. In 1999, the Korean Federation of Construction Industry Trade 
Unions (KFCITU) incorporated day laborers into a new organization alongside the 
predominantly white-collar-based Korean Federation of Construction Trade Unions (Yun, 
2017: 19).  
7 In May 2015, the LO-TCO officially became Union to Union. The International Federation 
of Building and Wood Workers Unions merged with the World Federation of Building and 
Woodworkers Union to form the global Building and Woodworkers International (BWI) in 
2005. 
8 For example, Article 23 of the 2015 agreement contains this provision, but it also existed in 
earlier versions. 
9 This differs significantly from the government report, which estimates the number of 
construction casting workers in the city to be 2,200 based on employer reports (Sim, Kim, 
and Kim, 2013). 
10 During the interview, Chi specified that the union could not take credit for the initial 
improvement in employment conditions for formwork carpenters since the tight labor market 
resulted in better treatment. Nonetheless, the union was able to transform marketplace 
bargaining power to workplace bargaining power (Silver, 2003) and maintain the improved 
employment conditions for union members even during the recession. 
11 According to Statistics Korea (2016), domestic construction projects had a total budget of 
213 trillion won (KRW). Of this, 90.6 trillion won was spent in the Seoul metropolitan area 
(52.9 trillion won in Gyeonggi Province); 30.3 trillion won in Busan, Ulsan, and Gyeongnam 
Province; and 19.9 trillion won in Daegu and Gyeongbuk Province. 
12 Many small-scale construction sites routinely violate health and safety laws and fear 
incurring damaging fines and penalties, compared to large-scale sites. 
13 KCWU eventually bargained a uniform collective agreement with all regional Steel and 
Concrete Councils in September 2017. Five regional branches of KCWU built agreements 
with six regional Steel and Concrete Councils in the Seoul capital region, Daejeon and 
Sejong, Jeonnam, Gyeongbuk, and Gyeongnam regions. 
14 The high-risk nature of union activity by informal workers is most recently evident in the 
indictment of KCWU Tower Crane Division union executives for violating the Criminal Act; 
Punishment of Violence Etc. Act; Act on Aggravated Punishment Etc. of Specific Crimes 
(Prosecution Service, 2015). 
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